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A Critical Take on Group Regulation of 
Insurers in the United States 
Daniel Schwarcz* 
U.S. insurance regulation focuses predominantly on individual 
insurance entities rather than on groups of commonly owned and managed 
companies. Yet the bailout of AIG and emerging international norms 
increasingly suggest that effective insurance regulation must operate on both 
a legal-entity and a group-wide basis. For this reason, state insurance 
regulators have in recent years articulated a “windows and walls” 
framework for group insurance regulation. This framework attempts to 
insulate individual insurance companies from potential financial risks 
associated with their parents and affiliates (“walls”), while simultaneously 
allowing regulators to remain attuned to these risks (“windows”). This 
Article argues that this framework largely fails to meet the goals of group 
regulation in insurance because it relies almost exclusively on the capacity 
and willingness of state insurance regulators to investigate, diagnose, and 
respond to group-level risks effectively. This is problematic because group 
risk in insurance is immensely complicated and inherently dynamic. 
Meanwhile, state insurance regulators have poor incentives to invest their 
limited efforts and resources towards regulating group risk, as the potential 
negative consequences of group risk extend well beyond their states’ borders. 
This Article illustrates these points by focusing on two recent case studies: 
the precrisis regulation of securities lending at AIG and the recent rise of 
shadow insurance among U.S. life insurers. In both instances, the Article 
argues that the entity-centric orientation of state insurance regulators caused 
them to fail to appreciate or prevent the buildup of substantial risk within 
groups of affiliated insurance companies. Ultimately, the Article suggests 
that effective group regulation in insurance requires either group-oriented 
state insurance regulation that relies less on the discretion of individual 
regulators or regulation of group-level risk by a federal entity. 
 
 
 
* Daniel Schwarcz is an Associate Professor of Law and Solly Robins Distinguished Research Fellow 
at the University of Minnesota. 
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INTRODUCTION 
U.S. insurance regulation focuses on individual corporate entities that are 
engaged in the business of insurance.1 By contrast, it pays much more limited 
attention to groups of companies that are commonly owned or controlled and 
engage predominantly in the business of insurance.2 Thus, one AIG insurance 
company may be dangerously undercapitalized, while another AIG insurance 
company may be extremely well capitalized. Similarly, one Allstate company may be 
permitted to sell narrow policy forms and have a substantial history of market-
conduct violations, while another may only sell generous policy forms and have a 
sterling market-conduct record. 
Although this regulatory focus is on individual legal entities, most insurance 
companies are operated almost entirely as a group—or, in some cases, as several 
groups3—of related companies.4 In most insurance groups, a common set of board 
members and team of senior managers direct the financial, business, and risk-
 
1. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, THE UNITED STATES INSURANCE FINANCIAL 
SOLVENCY FRAMEWORK (2010); Kris DeFrain, Insurance Group Supervision, CIPR NEWSL. (NAIC & Ctr. 
for Ins. Policy & Research, Kansas City, Mo.), Apr. 2012, available at http://www.naic.org/
cipr_newsletter_archive/vol3_ins_group_supervision.htm [http://perma.cc/VHA4-SF78]. 
2. See FIN. STABILITY BD., PEER REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 32 (2013), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130827.pdf [http://perma.cc/LCR3-
WJ2H] (“The FSAP found that while the state-based regulatory system was effective in assuring 
policyholder protection and the soundness of individual insurance companies, it lacked a systemic focus 
and the capacity to exercise group-wide oversight.”); Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating 
Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569 (2014). 
3. In some cases, an insurance group may practically operate as several groupings of companies. 
This is particularly likely when a large insurance group is acquired by another group. For instance, the 
Zurich group of insurance companies includes the Farmers group of companies, but the Farmers group 
operates with some independence from the larger Zurich operation. 
4. INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES, STANDARDS, 
GUIDANCE AND ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 23 (2011) (defining an insurance group by reference 
to whether the individual companies are collectively managed and substantially influence one another’s 
activities); Elizabeth F. Brown, The New Laws and Regulations for Financial Conglomerates: Will They Better 
Manage the Risks than the Previous Ones?, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1339, 1357–89 (2011) (exploring generally the 
problems with the supervision of financial conglomerates prior to Dodd-Frank). 
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management decisions of individual companies within the group. Additionally, 
operations of individual companies within a group are often integrated across entity 
lines: sales, underwriting, legal, portfolio management, and adjusting personnel 
often work, in practice, for the larger group of insurance entities within the holding 
company, rather than for any single legal entity within that group. 
U.S. entity-centric insurance regulation thus defies the “on-the-ground” 
realities of how many, if not most, insurance companies actually operate. 
Recognizing this fact, U.S. insurance regulation supplements entity-centric 
regulation with various group-focused regulatory strategies, which have recently 
been organized under the heading of “windows and walls.”5 Most importantly, U.S. 
insurance regulation employs various ring-fencing rules (i.e., “walls”) that attempt 
to insulate individual insurance companies from potential financial risks that might 
arise in connection with their affiliates or parent companies.6 At the same time, U.S. 
insurance regulation has increasingly sought to keep regulators attuned to risks from 
parents or affiliates of regulated entities (i.e., “windows”). Thus, insurance 
regulators have begun to require holding companies to produce various risk-
management assessments, increased their authority to demand from regulated 
entities information about their affiliates, and attempted to better coordinate their 
regulation of companies within a group through supervisory colleges, collaborative 
working groups, and voluntary exchanges of information.7 
Despite these various group-oriented supplements to entity-centric insurance 
regulation, this Article argues that U.S. insurance regulation does not, and cannot, 
achieve the goals of group-wide regulation of insurers. The Article first briefly 
explains why effective group-wide supervision of insurance groups is necessary, 
echoing the conclusions of much of the international insurance supervisory 
community.8 Next, this Article argues that the “windows and walls” approach of 
 
5. Memorandum from Grp. Solvency Issues (EX) Working Grp., to Christina Urias, Dir. & 
Chair of the Solvency Modernization Initiatives (EX) Task Force (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://
www.naic.org/documents/index_smi_group_solvency_windows_and_walls.pdf [http://perma.cc/
RY9T-2DU4]. 
6. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM 
REGULATORY ACT (2011) [hereinafter NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SYSTEM REGULATORY ACT], 
available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/current-issues-reform/agency-meetings/documents/MDL
.pdf [http://perma.cc/S58Y-XMXH] (Model #440); NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, INSURANCE 
HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM MODEL REGULATION WITH REPORTING FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
(2011), available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-450.pdf  [https://web.archive.org/web/
20150713074006/http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-450.pdf] (Model #450). For an overview of 
ring-fencing, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69 (2013). 
7. See Elizabeth F. Brown & Robert W. Klein, Insurance Solvency Regulation: A New World Order?, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter 
Siegelman eds., forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 61–71) (on file with the UC Irvine Law Review); see 
also FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM 
OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (2013). 
8. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 2, at 32; INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, COMMON 
FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONALLY ACTIVE INSURANCE GROUPS FOR CONSULTATION 35 (2013), 
available at http://www.actuaries.org/LIBRARY/Submissions/FTP8_2013_IAIS_Consultation
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U.S. state insurance regulation is unlikely to achieve the objectives of group 
supervision. At its core, the reason is that the effectiveness of the “windows and 
walls” framework is highly “enforcement sensitive”: it relies almost exclusively on 
the capacity and willingness of state insurance regulators to investigate, diagnose, 
and respond to group-level risks effectively. 
In practice, however, there is very little reason to believe that state insurance 
regulators are able or willing to conduct effective group-oriented supervision that 
relies so heavily on their discretionary oversight. The core problem is that state 
insurance regulators simply do not have strong incentives to appreciate group risk, 
even when they are asked to do so in supervisory colleges or National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) working groups.9 State insurance regulators 
are politically and financially beholden to their individual jurisdictions: the time they 
invest in investigating, understanding, and responding to risks that extend beyond 
the borders of their individual states do not clearly advance the interests of their 
constituents. Such activities, therefore, are unlikely to be sufficiently funded or 
encouraged.10 
Yet, understanding the enterprise-level risks of massive insurance groups is a 
full-time job, to say the least. Large insurance groups may have hundreds of 
individual legal entities operating across the globe and pursuing extremely complex 
business, investment, and risk-management strategies. Appreciating risk across 
these entities requires not just understanding the exposures of these individual 
companies, but also understanding how they may interact, both to increase or 
decrease financial strength. It is simply not realistic to expect that individual state 
insurance regulators—whose funding and job responsibilities are inherently tied to 
the jurisdiction from which they reside—will be able to devote sufficient resources 
and time to preemptively identifying and responding to these risks. 
This Article illustrates these points by focusing on two recent case studies: the 
precrisis regulation of securities lending at AIG and the recent rise of shadow 
insurance among U.S. life insurers. In both instances, the Article argues that the 
entity-centric orientation of state insurance regulators caused them to fail to 
appreciate or prevent the buildup of substantial risk within insurance holding 
companies. 
Ultimately, the Article stops short of opining on what types of reform would 
best improve the regulation of insurance groups in the United States, saving this 
topic for future work. But the Article does conclude by noting that its arguments 
 
Document.pdf [http://perma.cc/UT2J-2T3S]; INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, supra note 4, at 
342–60 (noting all principles apply to both the insurer and the group unless otherwise stated). 
9. For an overview of supervisory colleges, see Gita Timmerman, Supervisory Colleges: A Regulatory 
Tool for Enhancing Supervisory Cooperation and Coordination, CIPR NEWSL. (NAIC & Ctr. for Ins. Policy & 
Research, Kansas City, Mo.), July 2012. 
10. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 14–16 (William J. Baumol ed., 1972); see also 
Martin F. Grace, The Economics of State vs. Federal Regulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW, supra note 7 (manuscript at 7–10). 
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suggest two potential reform routes. First, state insurance regulation could embrace 
less enforcement-sensitive forms of group supervision, such as consolidated capital 
requirements and more rule-based restrictions on transactions among affiliates. 
Second, group supervision of insurance-oriented companies could be systematically 
moved to a federal regulator such as the Federal Reserve (Fed), in a manner that 
would build on the Fed’s current regulation of certain nonbank financial companies 
under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank). 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUP-WIDE SUPERVISION IN INSURANCE 
In the last decade, the international community has come to embrace the need 
for effective group-wide supervision of commonly controlled insurance entities. 
Indeed, the need for both effective entity-level and group-wide supervision is a core 
principle of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).11 The 
need for such a supervisory perspective is based on the fact that the risks associated 
with any individual insurance entity are deeply influenced by that entity’s affiliate 
and parent companies.12 In many cases, a strong insurance group can serve as a 
source of strength for an individual entity facing financial stress. For instance, 
recent research shows that, in the midst of the financial crisis, many life insurers 
received large capital contributions from other entities within their parent 
companies.13 
Even more relevant for regulatory purposes, an insurance entity’s financial 
risk can also be substantially increased as a result of its relationships with its affiliate 
and parent companies. The mechanisms by which risk can spread across corporate 
boundaries within a holding company are numerous and include ill-advised 
transactions among affiliates, reputational harm spreading among affiliates, and an 
increased tolerance for risk fostered by the financial strength of the larger group. 
Complicated corporate structures can not only increase company risk but can also 
decrease regulatory effectiveness. For instance, they can facilitate regulatory 
arbitrage through strategies such as double gearing, which is the use of the same 
underlying capital for two regulated institutions.14 
For some companies, effective group-wide supervision may be necessary for 
 
11. INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, supra note 4, at 342–60. 
12. See generally Andrew Kuritzkes et al., Risk Measurement, Risk Management, and Capital Adequacy 
in Financial Conglomerates, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 2003, at 141, 
151 (Robert E. Litan & Richard J. Herring eds., 2003) (noting that supervisors of individual subsidiaries 
within financial conglomerates face challenges in managing risk because they lack a “group-wide 
perspective”). 
13. For a detailed discussion, see Gregory Niehaus, Managing Capital and Insolvency Risk via 
Internal Capital Market Transactions: The Case of Life Insurers 1 (Feb. 2, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2429024. 
14. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PRINCIPLES 
FOR THE SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 15 (2012), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint29.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP2J-7QFJ?type=pdf]. 
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macroprudential or systemic risk reasons as well. Risk-management, investment, 
and business strategies are all generally determined at the holding company level.15 
Failures in any of these domains can potentially have negative effects on the stability 
of the larger financial system because they can simultaneously impact all of the 
entities within the group structure.16 AIG serves as a suitable example: AIG 
embraced a company-wide strategy that effectively treated extreme downturns in 
the U.S. housing market as impossible. When this in fact occurred, numerous AIG 
affiliates simultaneously experienced extreme financial distress, thereby 
contributing to broad financial and economic instability in 2008. 
A third reason that group-wide supervision is important is because financial 
markets and policyholders generally interact with insurers on a group-wide basis. 
Most public insurance companies are owned only at the holding company level. And 
policyholders often assess financial strength and other elements of a company’s 
reputation globally, on the basis of the larger insurance group. All of this is 
significant from a regulatory perspective because effective regulation often requires 
being attuned to market and policyholder reactions to companies, which can contain 
important information about potential regulatory issues at the company. At the 
same time, many forms of regulation require facilitating effective communication 
with markets, including product and financial markets, to enhance the power of 
market discipline. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. GROUP SUPERVISION IN INSURANCE 
Insurance regulation in the United States is the primary responsibility of the 
individual states, rather than the federal government.17 This principle is reflected in 
the central U.S. federal insurance statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which 
proclaims that “the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the 
business of insurance is in the public interest.”18 Although individual states regulate 
the business of insurance conducted within their geographic boundaries, they 
coordinate extensively through the NAIC.19 This coordination includes drafting 
model laws and regulations for adoption in the states, organizing enforcement 
 
15. See Brown, supra note 4, at 1339. 
16. See Xavier Freixas et al., Regulating Financial Conglomerates, 16 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 479, 
482 (2007) (explaining that integrated conglomerates have common liabilities and consequently, 
“[l ]arge-scale losses in non-bank divisions therefore harm bank depositors, and so result in a call upon 
the deposit insurance fund”). 
17. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: 
Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 20–26 (1993); Susan Randall, 
Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629–34 (1999). 
18. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1011–15 (2012)). 
19. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2015). 
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efforts, and monitoring one another to ensure the sufficiency of their regulatory 
authority and resources.20 
State insurance regulation currently focuses most of its solvency-related efforts 
on the financial health of individual insurance companies. Under the state 
regulatory regime, individual operating insurance companies must file various 
financial statements using Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP).21 Unlike 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), financial reports produced 
under SAP do not aggregate the financial information of commonly-owned 
companies. Instead, they provide regulators with a detailed breakdown of the 
financial status of individual insurance entities.22 They also provide regulators with 
the sole source of data on which all of the core forms of U.S. solvency regulation 
are built: capital standards, reserve requirements, investment restrictions, and 
financial monitoring and analysis are all conducted using the data in annual financial 
statements regarding individual insurance companies.23 
Although the financial statements of individual operating companies are filed 
(though the NAIC) with each state in which they are licensed to do business, these 
reports are generally closely reviewed and audited by only two sources: the NAIC 
and the state in which the operating company is domiciled.24 The NAIC uses an 
Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) to test the financial data submitted 
by insurance companies for potential signs of financial distress.25 Meanwhile, the 
state in which an insurer is domiciled also reviews this data to ensure that various 
regulatory requirements—such as capital, reserve, and investment restrictions—are 
satisfied.26 By contrast, this financial data is generally not closely scrutinized by the 
states in which individual companies are licensed to conduct business but are not 
domiciled. Instead, these states defer to the financial analysis and regulation of the 
state of domicile, relying on the fact that every state is accredited by the NAIC as 
possessing the necessary laws, resources, and expertise to conduct such regulation 
effectively.27 
This entity-centric approach of U.S. insurance regulation is fundamentally 
connected to its state-based architecture. Historically, many large insurance holding 
companies adapted to the mismatch between state-based insurance regulation and 
the national and international scope of their operations by incorporating individual 
 
20. Id. 
21. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 15. 
22. Legislative Proposals to Reform Domestic Insurance Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and 
Ins. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 80–97 (2014) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals] (statement of 
Daniel Schwarcz, Associate Professor & Solly Robbins Distinguished Research Fellow, Univ. of Minn. 
Law School). 
23. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 4. 
24. Id. at 26. 
25. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 19, at 122. 
26. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 1, at 26. 
27. For an overview of this process of coordination of state solvency regulation via the 
accreditation process, see ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 19, at 118. 
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insurance entities within multiple different states.28 In many cases, they also 
incorporated different entities within a single state to address state-specific 
regulatory issues, such as form or price regulation.29 
In concert with its entity-focused approach, state insurance regulation also 
employs what it describes as a “windows and walls” approach to group 
supervision.30 The “walls” of the state regulatory process are designed to ring-fence 
individual regulated entities from various risks that may be associated with their 
affiliates or holding companies. The most important elements of these “walls”31 are 
laws—contained in every state—requiring that insurers’ transactions with affiliates 
be on terms that are “fair and reasonable.”32 In the case of any material transactions 
with affiliates, insurers must notify regulators of their intent to enter into such a 
transaction and can only proceed if the commissioner does not disapprove doing 
so within a specified period of time (usually thirty days).33 These transactions 
include, among others: (i) extraordinary dividends or other distributions; (ii) 
substantial sales, loans, or investments; (iii) most reinsurance agreements; (iv) 
management agreements, service contracts, and tax allocation agreements; and (v) 
various guarantees.34 To monitor compliance with these provisions, state regulators 
require insurers to report in their annual financial statements a complete list of every 
member of the holding company system and all nonroutine transactions with any 
of these entities.35 
The “windows” of U.S. insurance regulation are designed to allow regulators 
of individual operating entities to assess potential risks from affiliates that may 
impact the operating entity. These “windows” include required detailed financial 
information of any entity controlling the insurer, provision of preexisting financial 
statements of all affiliates, and the right to acquire information from operating 
insurance entities and their insurance affiliates regarding potential enterprise risk to 
 
28. See generally Kathy R. Petron & Douglas A. Shackelford, Taxation, Regulation, and the 
Organizational Structure of Property-Casualty Insurers, 20 J. ACCT. & ECON. 229 (1995) (exploring how 
regulatory factors influence whether property/casualty insurers expand into other states by acquiring a 
license or by establishing a separate subsidiary); Steven W. Pottier and David W. Sommer, Regulatory 
Stringency and New York Licensed Life Insurers, 65 J. RISK & INS. 485 (1998) (exploring how life insurers 
adapted to New York’s “appleton rule,” which requires that any insurer that conducts business in New 
York must comply with New York regulations in any state in which it does business by incorporating 
separate New York life insurance entities). 
29. See The Impact of Credit-Based Insurance Scoring on the Availability and Affordability of Insurance: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 8-9 (2008) 
(statement of Eric S. Poe, Chief Operating Officer, CURE Auto Insurance) (explaining how Geico 
maintains four separate legal entities so as to charge different rates to different classes of policyholders). 
30. DeFrain, supra note 1. 
31. These walls also include substantial scrutiny of sales or purchases of insurance entities or 
changes in control of those entities. 
32. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SYSTEM REGULATORY ACT, supra note 6, at 440-15. 
33. Id. at 440-19 to -20. 
34. Id. at 440-16. 
35. Id. at 440-19 to -22. 
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the insurer.36 Additionally, they include a requirement that the ultimate controlling 
entity file an annual “Enterprise Risk Report” as well as an Own Risk and Solvency 
Assessment (ORSA); both reports identify the main enterprise risks to the holding 
company system.37 State insurance regulators do not, however, have the regulatory 
authority to demand information directly from noninsurer affiliates of regulated 
insurance entities. 
To help analyze these data, insurance regulators designate a lead state among 
the various domestic regulators of the individual entities.38 Additionally, they 
coordinate with one another as well as with other functional regulators of entities 
within the group. This coordination occurs through regulators’ participation in 
supervisory colleges and NAIC working groups such as the Financial Analysis 
Working Group (FAWG).39 
In sharp contrast to the entity-centric approach of state regulators, insurance 
groups that are determined to be systemically significant by the U.S. Financial 
Stability Oversight Council are subject to consolidated regulation at the federal level 
by the Fed under Dodd-Frank.40 Currently, three insurers—AIG, Prudential, and 
MetLife—have been found to be systemically significant, although MetLife is 
contesting this designation in court as of publication.41 Insurers are also subject to 
consolidated regulation by the Fed if they control a depository institution, a category 
that includes approximately one dozen insurers in the United States.42 Under Dodd-
Frank, this regulation of insurance groups must include, among other things: “(A) 
risk-based capital requirements; (B) leverage limits; (C) liquidity requirements; (D) 
resolution plan and credit exposure report requirements; (E) concentration 
limits; . . . and (I) overall risk management requirements.”43 Unfortunately, the 
details of these forms of consolidated regulation by the Fed are still very much 
unclear, as the Fed has not issued rules as of publication specifying how it will 
 
36. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS HANDBOOK 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_isftf_group_solvency_2014_financial_analysis
_handbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/H96H-NG2D]. Insurance regulators do not generally have any direct 
authority over an insurer’s noninsurer affiliates or parent companies. Although the NAIC’s Model 
Holding Company Act does allow states to require parent companies of insurers to file an enterprise 
risk report, it provides regulators with no enforcement authority over the parent (rather than the insurer) 
if the parent does not comply. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SYSTEM REGULATORY ACT, supra 
note 6, § 4L. 
37. Brown & Klein, supra note 7, at 53. 
38. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 36, at 3. 
39. Brown & Klein, supra note 7, at 52. 
40. See Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 113, 124 Stat. 1398, 1398–1402 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012)). See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight 
and the Shifting Balance of State and Federal Authority Over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015). 
41. See Zachary Tracer & Ian Katz, MetLife Challenges Risk Tag, Sets Stage for Court Clash, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Oct. 3, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-03/
metlife-challenges-risk-tag-sets-stage-for-court-clash.html [http://perma.cc/KV3D-47RK]. 
42. § 113, 124 Stat. at 1521–23. 
43. Id. at 1398–1402. 
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approach these issues. However, the Fed has substantial experience regulating bank 
holding companies, as it is the regulator of all such entities under the Bank Holding 
Company Act.44 
III. THE ENFORCEMENT-SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE  
“WINDOWS AND WALLS” FRAMEWORK 
All forms of financial regulation can be located on a spectrum reflecting the 
extent to which their effectiveness in constraining risk-taking relies on active 
monitoring and enforcement by regulators.45 On one end of the spectrum are 
relatively enforcement-insensitive strategies, such as simple leverage rules or fixed 
capital requirements.46 Each of these forms of regulation is relatively 
straightforward in its application to individual companies and thus hard for firms 
to game. For that reason, even when regulators do a relatively poor job of 
monitoring and enforcement, most firms will tend to comply simply because it is 
easy to identify transgressions. Even if regulators were sufficiently clueless or 
captured that they would not act in the face of blatant regulatory violations, risk-
management personnel within the firm, investors, or media outlets would be 
relatively likely to respond to any such violations, at least if they were long sustained. 
By contrast, many forms of financial regulation are enforcement sensitive in 
that their effectiveness is highly contingent on effective monitoring and 
enforcement by regulators. For instance, financial exams depend critically on the 
ability of individual examiners to accurately identify and assess risk and then convey 
those assessments clearly in their reports and related documents or 
determinations.47 Similarly, extremely complex rules, such as restrictions on 
“proprietary trading” contained in the Volcker rule, may be relatively enforcement 
sensitive because they may be easy for firms to game, either through aggressive 
 
44. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act), 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (2012). 
45. The distinction between enforcement-sensitive and -insensitive regulatory rules tracks, to 
some degree, the more general distinction between rules and standards. But the overlap is imperfect. 
For instance, sufficiently complex rules can be enforcement sensitive. Even simple regulatory rules may 
be enforcement sensitive if there is little transparency with respect to firms’ observance of these rules 
or the threat of litigation associated with violating these rules. On the other hand, most regulatory 
standards are indeed probably enforcement sensitive. 
46. Peter Eavis, Banks Ordered to Add Capital to Limit Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2014, at A1 
(noting that regulators have argued that increasing leverage ratio from three percent to five percent is 
“a more straightforward tool that will be harder to evade and easier to enforce than many of the new 
regulations covering the sprawling, complex businesses of banking”). For a powerful defense of simple 
leverage and capital rules as the primary tool for the regulation of financial enterprises, see ANAT 
ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 94–96 (2013). 
47. See generally Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 
IND. L.J. 645, 648 (2012) (arguing that enforcement-sensitive capital requirements are not effective and 
that capital rules should be set so that they are sufficient without the need for significant discretionary 
capital increases). For one recent indictment of the pitfalls of enforcement-sensitive banking 
supervision that made its way into the popular press, see This American Life: The Secret Recordings of Carmen 
Segarra, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 26, 2014) (downloaded using iTunes). 
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interpretations of the rule’s application or by regulatory arbitrage strategies.48 
Violations—or aggressive interpretations—of complex rules may also be much 
harder for potential watchdogs to identify or respond to by generating public outcry. 
Of course, enforcement-sensitive regulatory approaches have their own virtues: for 
instance, they are generally more nuanced and adaptable than enforcement-
insensitive regulatory strategies. 
Insurance solvency regulation—like most other forms of financial 
regulation—generally uses a blend of enforcement-sensitive and -insensitive 
regulatory strategies.49 On one end of the spectrum, investment restrictions and 
certain rules governing reserving (such as those applicable to Level Term policies) 
are relatively enforcement insensitive because the application of these rules to 
individual insurance entities is usually relatively unambiguous. Additionally, various 
nonregulatory actors—including private rating agencies, public interest groups, and 
academic researchers—can, and do, double-check compliance with these rules in 
the course of performing their own analyses of risk at these companies. On the 
other end of the spectrum, insurance regulators also use various enforcement-
sensitive approaches to safeguarding insurers’ financial health, such as requirements 
that senior management of insurers be experienced and qualified.50 
However, virtually every component of the “windows and walls” framework 
of U.S. insurance regulation is highly enforcement sensitive.51 Consider first the 
“windows” of the system. These “windows” are designed to allow regulators to 
observe and assess risks to individual entities that may arise from their affiliates or 
parents. But in order for this to occur, regulators must effectively analyze and 
comprehend lengthy and complicated reports of insurance groups. They must be 
able to spot assumptions, logical flaws, or gaps in information, and then they must 
be willing to proactively follow up with groups to affirmatively request missing 
information or analysis. In contrast to the reserve requirements, investment 
restrictions, or financial ratio analyses of standard solvency regulation, there are not 
relatively self-applying quantitative restrictions at the group level. 
In the event that insurance regulators become concerned about group-level 
risks, their options for action are hardly straightforward: they may prioritize 
financial exams of the underlying entities, more stringently evaluate proposed 
 
48. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plumber”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, 
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 55 (2013); Charles A. Piasio, It’s Complicated: Why the Volcker Rule Is Unworkable, 43 
SETON HALL L. REV. 737, 739–40 (2013). 
49. See generally ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 19. 
50. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, WHITE PAPER ON HIGH-LEVEL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR USE IN U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION ¶ 5.2.6 (on file with the UC 
Irvine Law Review). 
51. See Theresa M. Vaughan, CEO, NAIC, Comments to the NAIC Solvency Modernization 
Initiative (SMI) Task Force: Group Supervision and the IAIS Common Framework for the Supervision 
of Internationally Active Insurance Groups (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.naic.org/documents/
smi_vaughan_110328.pdf [http://perma.cc/TM7G-XEBY] (emphasizing that group supervision in 
the United States “is more about supervision than regulation”). 
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transactions with affiliates, or raise concerns within supervisory colleges. Here too, 
there is a sharp contrast with ordinary state solvency regulation, wherein prompt 
corrective action provisions specify clear rules for how and when regulators must 
act depending on the regulated entity’s Risk-Based Capital (RBC) ratios.52 In sum, 
the value of the “windows” of U.S. insurance regulation depends entirely on how 
regulators use them. 
Surprisingly, the “walls” of the U.S. insurance regulatory system are also highly 
enforcement sensitive. This is for two reasons. First, the core premise of these rules 
is the broad standard that transactions must be “fair and reasonable.”53 As with all 
broad standards, this requirement inherently derives its meaning and stringency 
from ex post application to specific cases.54 In the absence of effective enforcement, 
such standards become largely meaningless. Second—a crucial fact that has 
seemingly escaped comment in existing critiques of the U.S. regulatory system—is 
that the NAIC Model Holding Company Act creates a file-and-use system for 
transactions among affiliates, whereby all such transactions are permitted in the face 
of regulatory inaction.55 The default stance of all U.S. state insurance regulation is 
thus that all transactions among affiliates are permissible. 
This default setting is likely to be quite significant, though no empirical 
research exists focusing on state regulators’ scrutiny of transactions among 
affiliates. First, a very large literature documents that defaults often influence 
outcomes in a wide variety of settings.56 By setting the regulatory default such that 
all transactions among affiliates are permissible, U.S. insurance regulation relies on 
regulators to affirmatively intervene to stop transactions that they find 
objectionable. Second, it is well known that state insurance departments are often 
resource constrained.57 In many cases, it may simply be that regulators cannot 
devote prompt and careful attention to analyzing the propriety of transactions 
among insurance affiliates. In such cases, all such transactions are allowed. 
Interestingly, these insurance-oriented group regulatory rules contrast sharply 
with the analogous rules in U.S. banking regulation, which are contained in sections 
 
52. See generally J. David Cummins et al., Insolvency Experience, Risk-Based Capital, and Prompt 
Corrective Action in Property-Liability Insurance, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 511 (1995). 
53. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SYSTEM REGULATORY ACT, supra note 6, § 5(A)(1)(a), 
at 440-19. 
54. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 591 (1992). 
55. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SYSTEM REGULATORY ACT, supra note 6, § 5(A)(2) 
(“The following transactions involving a domestic insurer and any person in its insurance holding 
company system, including amendments or modifications of affiliate agreements previously filed 
pursuant to this section, which are subject to any materiality standards contained in subparagraphs (a) 
through (g), may not be entered into unless the insurer has notified the commissioner in writing of its 
intention to enter into the transaction at least thirty (30) days prior thereto, or such shorter period as 
the commissioner may permit, and the commissioner has not disapproved it within that period.”). 
56. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006). 
57. See FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 7, at 34 (noting that state 
insurance regulators may not have sufficient resources or expertise to adequately assess complex insurer 
self-assessment of risks). 
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23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.58 In addition to similar requirements that 
transactions must be fair and reasonable, these rules contain various quantitative 
requirements that are harder (though certainly not impossible) to undermine 
through lax enforcement. Examples include restrictions on covered transactions 
with affiliates to no more than twenty percent of capital and requirements that loans 
and guarantees between affiliates be fully collateralized.59 Additionally, the default 
in banking regulation is set so that covered transactions are not permitted unless the 
relevant regulator affirmatively approves those transactions.60 
Taking a broader perspective, it is hardly surprising that any U.S. insurance 
regulation that is focused on the group, rather than individual legal entities, is highly 
enforcement sensitive. In large part, this diagnosis stems inevitably from the fact 
that all insurance financial reporting in the United States is inherently linked to 
individual operating entities.61 Indeed, consolidated financial reports are not even 
produced under SAP,62 and using individual financial reports of operating 
companies to generate an understanding of the group’s strength is difficult, if not 
impossible. Meanwhile, while publicly owned insurance groups report consolidated 
data, they do so using GAAP, an accounting system which state insurance regulators 
actively resist for purposes of generating regulatory requirements.63 The lack of 
quantitative data at the holding company level limits the capacity of state regulators 
to craft formulaic or rule-like restrictions at the group level. 
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH ENFORCEMENT-SENSITIVE APPROACHES TO 
INSURANCE GROUP REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Enforcement-sensitive regulatory approaches are, by definition, only as 
effective as the regulators who implement and enforce them. Yet, there is very little 
reason to believe that individual state insurance regulators in the United States can 
or will consistently identify and respond to group-level insurer risk if doing so 
requires them to exercise a substantial amount of effort, resources, and political will. 
This is for at least two reasons. 
 
58. Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act restricts transactions, such as lending, between 
federally insured deposit-taking banks and their nonbank affiliates. See generally Saule T. Omarova, From 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 1683, 1686 (2011). 
59. For an overview of the various quantitative and qualitative restrictions that are imposed 
under Sections 23A and B, see RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 403–07 (5th ed., 2013). 
60. See Omarova, supra note 58, at 1692. 
61. See Legislative Proposals, supra note 22. 
62. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ACCOUNTING PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 
MANUAL AS OF MARCH 2007 (2007); NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STATUTORY ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES WORKING GROUP MAINTENANCE AGENDA SUBMISSION FORM, FORM A, ASU 2014-
10: DEVELOPMENT STAGE ENTITIES 2 (2014) (“Statutory financial statements are completed on a legal 
entity basis, and are not consolidated. GAAP guidance regarding consolidation is rejected . . . .”). 
63. See generally Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP), NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & CTR. FOR 
INS. POLICY & RESEARCH, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_statutory_accounting_principles
.htm [http://perma.cc/9LUZ-P5C6] (last updated May 14, 2015). 
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The first reason to doubt the efficacy of enforcement-sensitive group 
regulation in the United States is that individual state insurance regulators are 
politically accountable only to the constituents in their jurisdictions.64 The insurance 
commissioners who run individual state insurance departments are all either directly 
elected or appointed by the state’s governor.65 And the state insurance department’s 
budget is determined by the state legislature. For these reasons, state insurance 
departments face limited incentives to devote their attention to regulatory activities 
whose potential benefits extend beyond their state borders.66 Yet large insurance 
groups operate nationally and internationally, and the benefits of effectively 
supervising these groups—in addition to supervising the legal entities within the 
group—are almost entirely felt outside of the boundaries of any individual state.67 
The second reason for doubting the efficacy of enforcement-sensitive group 
regulation by state regulators is that, quite apart from incentives, state insurance 
regulators are ideologically committed to a system of entity-focused regulation.68 As 
described above, entity-based regulation is deeply and inextricably linked to the 
state-based system of insurance regulation in the United States. Substantially shifting 
regulators’ energies to group-wide supervision of insurers would effectively concede 
that the state-based regulatory system makes little sense, particularly for insurance 
groups that operate nationally or internationally.69 Similarly, state insurance 
regulation is generally resistant to emerging international norms—including those 
emphasizing the importance of group-wide supervision.70 The reason is that 
subnational regulators generally understand their larger community of similar 
regulators to consist of other subnational regulators. In the United States, this 
community is the NAIC, where the norms and incentives that tend to favor entity-
centric regulation over group regulation are mutually reinforced in what amounts to 
an echo chamber. 
 
64. See Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1629. 
65. See Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, Regulator Performance, Regulatory Environment and 
Outcomes: An Examination of Insurance Regulator Career Incentives on State Insurance Markets, 32 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 116, 121 (2008). 
66. See OATES, supra note 10, at 16–17. 
67. See Brown & Klein, supra note 7 (emphasizing the increasing internationalization of the 
insurance industry); Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, The Allocation of Governmental Regulatory 
Authority: Federalism and the Case of Insurance Regulation, 74 J. RISK & INS. 207 (2007) (noting that regulation 
of insurance companies often has significant extraterritorial effects). Of course, this point is generally 
applicable to much international financial regulation. Indeed, the collective-action problem resulting 
from the positive externalities of effective financial regulation lie at the heart of the justification for 
such coordination in the first place. For this reason, effective financial regulatory coordination often 
requires enforcement-insensitive strategies that actually constrain individual supervisors in ways that are 
observable and verifiable. 
68. See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance 
Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 457–58 (2014). 
69. Cf. Grace, supra note 10 (noting that there is a strong prima facie case for regulating solvency 
at the federal level given the lack of state-specific preferences on this issue, economies of scale in 
effective regulation, and the fact that regulation in one jurisdiction has effects in other jurisdictions). 
70. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for Insurance Regulation, 34 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953, 984–88 (2009). 
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To illustrate these points, consider two recent settings in which state insurance 
regulators’ entity-centric focus led them to overlook substantial aggregations of risk 
among insurance holding companies: the regulation of Securities Lending at AIG 
and the rise of Shadow Insurance. 
A. Securities Lending at AIG 
State insurance regulators have repeatedly described the problems at AIG, 
which led to the biggest bailout of a private company in history, as stemming entirely 
from products and transactions that did not involve the company’s insurance 
entities. According to this narrative, AIG’s problems leading up to its bailout were 
entirely attributable to the ill-fated Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) that were sold by 
its Financial Products division.71 This narrative is convenient for state insurance 
regulators because AIG’s financial products division was not a regulated insurance 
entity. Instead, the U.S. regulator most clearly charged with regulating this entity 
was the Office of Thrift Supervision, which was the group regulator for AIG prior 
to 2008.72 Additionally, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act—a federal 
law—had specifically exempted derivatives, including CDSs, from regulation,73 
such that state insurance regulators probably could not have regulated these 
products even if they desired to do so.74 
In fact, an equally important explanation for AIG’s massive problems leading 
up to 2008 was its ill-fated securities-lending program, which both relied upon the 
assets of AIG’s insurance companies and substantially jeopardized the financial 
health of these companies.75 Securities lending is a relatively common practice 
among insurance companies. It involves the lending out of securities to other firms 
on a short-term basis.76 It is generally understood to be a relatively safe way for 
 
71. See American International Group: Examining What Went Wrong, Government Intervention, and 
Implications for Future Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. 60 (2009) (testimony of Eric Dinallo, Superintendent, N.Y. State Ins. Dep’t); see also Jeffrey E. 
Thomas, Insurance Perspectives on Federal Financial Regulatory Reform: Addressing Misunderstandings and Providing 
a View from a Different Paradigm, 55 VILL. L. REV. 773, 773–77 (2010) (arguing that “insurance had little, 
if any, role in the crisis” because “AIG’s collapse was not an insurance problem”). 
72. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 988 (2009). 
73. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763A-365 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C. (2012)); see 
also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
74. See M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2009) 
(rejecting as unconvincing a possible argument that certain CDS’s could have been regulated by state 
insurance departments). 
75. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of the role of securities lending in AIG’s 
failure, see generally Hester Peirce, Securities Lending and the Untold Story in the Collapse of AIG (Mercatus 
Ctr., George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-12, 2014), available at http://
mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Peirce_SecuritiesLendingAIG_v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/CS52-VS5A]. 
Although Peirce’s discussion of securities lending at AIG is careful and comprehensive, her article draws 
various policy prescriptions from this story that are both highly contestable and largely unmoored from 
her analysis of AIG’s securities-lending programs. 
76. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & CTR. INS. POLICY & RESEARCH, CAPITAL MARKETS 
Schwarcz_production read v1 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 8/9/2015  11:24 AM 
552 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:537 
insurers to make money because entities that borrow securities must post cash 
collateral that generally exceeds the amount of the borrowed securities. Insurers 
generally make money in this exercise by reinvesting the cash collateral that they 
receive.77 In fact, insurers that lend out securities generally pay a fee to the entities 
that borrow the securities precisely because they can earn a return on the cash 
collateral that they receive in exchange for the borrowed securities. 
Securities lending can result in substantial instability because most such 
transactions are open for only very short periods of time: usually a single day. As a 
result, insurers’ counterparties in these transactions effectively retain the right to 
have their cash collateral returned to them at any point, in exchange for the 
borrowed securities.78 In other words, the cash that is provided to insurers in 
securities-lending transactions is an incredibly short-term liability. This can result in 
substantial asset/liability mismatches if the insurer has used its securities-lending 
program to invest in assets with impaired liquidity. To the extent that their collateral 
cannot be retrieved, counterparties in securities-lending transactions retain the 
contractual right to look to the assets of the underlying insurance companies to 
satisfy the amounts owed.79 
This is exactly what occurred to AIG in 2007 and 2008.80 Operating through 
AIG Global Asset Management Holding Company (Global Asset Management) and 
its subsidiaries, AIG Securities Lending Corporation and AIG Global Investment 
Corporation, AIG operated a securities-lending program that spanned the entire 
company.81 Under this program, Global Asset Management amassed a portfolio of 
$160 billion in securities to lend out.82 Approximately eighty percent of these 
securities were from AIG’s domestic insurance companies at the end of 2007.83 And 
by 2007, AIG invested up to seventy percent of its entire securities-lending 
operations in residential mortgage-backed securities and related instruments.84 
As AIG began experiencing substantial stresses throughout 2007 and 2008, its 
counterparties became increasingly wary of the company. Many started to terminate 
securities-lending transactions, and others continued such transactions only on 
much less favorable terms than had historically prevailed. But in September 2008, 
AIG’s counterparties ran en masse from AIG, redeeming up to $5.2 billion in cash 
 
SPECIAL REPORT: SECURITIES LENDING IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY (2011), available at http://
www.naic.org/capital_markets_archive/110708.htm [http://perma.cc/JP9J-DLDX]; Scott E. 
Harrington, The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance Regulation, 76 J. RISK & INS. 785, 
791–93 (2009). 
77. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & CTR. INS. POLICY & RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 1. 
78. Harrington, supra note 76, at 790. 
79. Cf. Robert L. McDonald & Anna Paulson, AIG in Hindsight 12–15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 21108, 2015) (examining the rights of AIG’s securities-lending 
counterparties had AIG declared bankruptcy and its insurance entities been placed into receivership). 
80. See Sjostrom, supra note 72, at 961–62. 
81. See Peirce, supra note 75, at 18–20. 
82. See id. at 18. 
83. See id. at 20. 
84. Id. at 21–25. 
Schwarcz_production read v1 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 8/9/2015  11:24 AM 
2015] GROUP REGULATION OF INSURERS 553 
collateral on a single day, September 15. The problem, of course, was that AIG 
faced massive liquidity problems in attempting to meet these redemptions because 
the market for mortgage-backed securities dried up concurrently so that these assets 
were, for all intents and purposes, completely unsellable. AIG could not, therefore, 
liquidate its investments in these instruments, which were financed using the cash 
collateral provided by securities-lending counterparties, to meet the rash of 
redemptions that it faced. 
The massive concentration of AIG’s securities-lending portfolio in mortgage-
backed securities created unique risks for AIG’s insurance entities because of the 
fact that other entities within AIG—particularly its notorious Financial Products 
division, which had entered into the company’s disastrous CDSs—had also bet 
massively on the U.S. housing sector. These correlations in risk exposures across 
AIG’s individual entities was at the core of AIG’s failure: it was not chance that 
AIG’s counterparties lost faith in the company at the same time that its securities-
lending portfolio was completely illiquid. Instead, the correlations in risk exposures 
across the financial products division and the securities-lending program were 
responsible for this unfortunate series of events. 
Despite the massive risks of AIG’s securities-lending program to its insurance 
companies as well as to AIG itself, state insurance regulators generally failed to 
identify or respond to this risk prior to September 2008. According to a U.S. 
Government Accountability Office report on AIG’s failure, “prior to mid-2007, 
state regulators had not identified losses in the securities-lending program and the 
lead life insurance regulator had reviewed the program without major concerns.”85 
State regulators began discussing the securities-lending issue as a group for the first 
time when the Texas Department of Insurance raised the issue in an AIG 
Supervisory College in November 2007.86 However, it was not until mid-2008 that 
state insurance regulators began to take concrete steps—such as requiring AIG to 
wind down its securities-lending operations and issuing general guidance—to 
address AIG’s securities-lending programs.87 These efforts, of course, proved to be 
too little, too late. Ultimately, approximately forty-six percent of AIG bailout funds 
was used to pay securities-lending counterparties.88 
In large part, state insurance regulators’ failure to diagnose or respond to the 
risks of this program are directly linked to the entity-centric nature of state insurance 
regulation. The basic problem was that AIG’s securities-lending program was 
operated at the holding company level. As a result, no individual insurance regulator 
took responsibility for carefully scrutinizing that program, despite the fact that AIG 
had several “lead” state insurance regulators. As former New York insurance 
 
85. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-616, FINANCIAL CRISIS: REVIEW OF 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 
13 (2011). 
86. Id. at 31. 
87. Id. at 17–18. 
88. Peirce, supra note 75, at 43. 
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commissioner Eric Dinallo admitted, in defending state insurance regulation during 
the crisis, AIG’s securities-lending operations “le[d] to . . . regulatory assignment 
questions.”89 Thus, while states clearly had the authority to examine AIG’s 
securities-lending programs prior to the crisis, and did in fact do so, their analysis 
was generally perfunctory and superficial. 
State insurance regulators also failed to appreciate the risks from AIG’s 
securities-lending program for a second reason related to their entity-centric 
approach: they were blind to AIG’s group-wide exposure to mortgage-backed 
securities. In particular, state insurance regulators generally had no information 
regarding the prospect that an AIG subsidiary like the company’s Financial Products 
division could have placed such large bets on the U.S. housing market by entering 
into CDSs. But the existence of these bets changed the character of the risk 
associated with AIG’s securities-lending portfolio because they resulted in the entire 
AIG company being exposed to the same tail-end risk. In other words, the 
investments of AIG’s securities-lending program would not have been nearly as 
risky if other AIG subsidiaries had not also placed such large bets on other financial 
instruments linked to the U.S. housing sector (i.e. CDSs). In the absence of AIG’s 
CDS portfolio, AIG’s securities-lending counterparties would have been much less 
likely to terminate these agreements with AIG, and, even if they had, the company 
could have almost certainly replaced the funding of this program with alternative 
sources. Thus, the securities-lending program of AIG turned out to be so risky 
precisely because it was deeply correlated with risks that pervaded the entire AIG 
holding company. State insurance regulators’ entity-centric approach blinded them 
to these correlations of risk taking across the holding company. 
To be sure, none of this means that enhanced group-wide regulation would 
have prevented AIG’s bailout. In fact, as mentioned above, AIG was indeed 
regulated at the group level by OTS, which proved just as blind to the massive 
aggregations of risk at the company as state insurance regulators. Of course, many 
explanations for OTS’s inept regulation of AIG and various other entities, such as 
Countrywide, have been offered, with a prime candidate being the ability of 
institutions to shop for their preferred regulator prior to Dodd-Frank.90 But the 
main point here is that the enforcement-sensitive nature of state group regulation 
contributed to state insurance regulators failing to respond sufficiently to 
aggregations of risks at AIG that substantially involved and impacted the company’s 
regulated insurers. This does not mean that less enforcement-sensitive group 
 
89. The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th 
Cong. 206 (2010) (testimony of Eric R. Dinallo, Former Superintendent, N.Y. State Ins. Dep’t). For a 
theoretical exploration of the importance of clarity of responsibility in the context of regulation, see 
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Dimitri Landa, Clarity of Responsibility and Dynamic Policy Making (2011), 
available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.194.2144&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
90. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011). But cf. Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, 
Requiem for a Regulator: The Office of Thrift Supervision’s Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
1777 (2011). 
Schwarcz_production read v1 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 8/9/2015  11:24 AM 
2015] GROUP REGULATION OF INSURERS 555 
regulation by states or better group-focused regulation by a more competent federal 
regulator would have prevented the AIG debacle. But it does mean that 
enforcement-sensitive state regulation of insurance groups will tend to do little to 
decrease the risk of such failures in the future. 
B. Shadow Insurance 
A second, and more recent, example of state insurance regulators’ inability to 
assess and respond to group-wide risk involves a broad phenomenon known as 
“shadow insurance.”91 In a shadow-insurance transaction, a life insurer reinsures a 
block of its business with an affiliated company that is a “captive” of its parent 
insurance company and that is not an “authorized” reinsurer.92 Historically, captive 
insurance companies were viewed as presenting limited regulatory concerns: many 
of the ordinary problems associated with insurance markets do not apply to 
standard insurance captives, which are used by noninsurance companies to self-
insure. As a result, captives are subject to very limited regulatory restrictions: their 
financial statements are not publicly available, they do not have to comply with 
statutory accounting rules and the associated reserve requirements, and they 
generally are not subject to standard risk-based capital requirements.93 
By engaging in shadow-insurance transactions, life insurance companies can 
take advantage of these limited regulatory rules for captive insurance companies and 
avoid regulatory rules with which they do not want to comply.94 The reason is that 
life insurers who reinsure their business are generally permitted to take a reserve 
credit in the amount of the reinsured business, thus effectively eliminating the 
reinsured liabilities from their balance sheets.95 Consistent with the entity-centric 
nature of state insurance regulation, however, state regulators do not allow 
insurance entities to take reserve credits for reinsurance unless they have substantial 
confidence that the reinsurer will actually pay claims when they come due, as the 
ceding insurer is ultimately responsible for paying policyholder claims even if the 
reinsurer is unable to do so. In order to take this credit, reinsurers must either be 
authorized (i.e., regulated in much the way that insurers themselves are) or they must 
provide collateral to support their reinsurance obligations.96 Captives in shadow-
 
91. See generally BENJAMIN M. LAWSKY, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., SHINING A LIGHT 
ON SHADOW INSURANCE: A LITTLE-KNOWN LOOPHOLE THAT PUTS INSURANCE POLICYHOLDERS 
AND TAXPAYERS AT GREATER RISK 4–5 (2013). 
92. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CAPTIVES AND SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES 16 (2013). 
93. See LAWSKY, supra note 91, at 2, 21. 
94. See FED. INS. OFFICE, supra note 7, at 32–34. 
95. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CREDIT FOR REINSURANCE MODEL LAW (2012), 
available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-785.pdf [http://perma.cc/FC85-K6QP]. 
96. Richard Spiller, Collateral for Reinsurance Obligations, FORC JOURNAL, Spring 2010, at 5, 6, 
available at http://www.forc.org/public/journals/54.pdf [http://perma.cc/9SKN-P8DK]; Susan 
Stryker, Securing Reinsurance: Letters of Credit and Regulation 114 Trusts, FORC JOURNAL, Spring 2010, at 
10, 10, available at http://www.forc.org/public/journals/54.pdf [http://perma.cc/9SKN-P8DK]. 
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insurance transactions always follow the latter course and provide collateral, 
typically either through a letter of credit or a trust maintained at a bank.97 
From an entity-centric-insurance regulatory perspective, because shadow-
insurance transactions are fully collateralized, state insurance regulators have 
generally viewed them as largely unproblematic. In the event that an unauthorized 
captive reinsurer cannot make good on its reinsurance obligations, the state 
insurance regulator can generally rest assured that the regulated entity will receive 
the funds owed through the collateralization of the reinsurer’s obligations. For this 
reason, until recently, state insurance regulators have not generally resisted shadow-
insurance transactions or seen them as posing much threat. Indeed, in the last 
decade the number of shadow-insurance transactions has increased exponentially in 
the life insurance market: shadow insurance grew from $11 billion in 2002 to $364 
billion in 2012.98 
Yet shadow insurance does in fact raise numerous risks that have been almost 
entirely overlooked by state insurance regulators for the last decade.99 First, in many 
shadow-insurance transactions, the underlying primary, ceding insurer, remains 
exposed to substantial risk. In many cases, for instance, the entity that guarantees 
the captive reinsurer’s obligations is itself a parent or affiliate of the ceding insurer. 
In such cases, the “collateral” that is used to support the reinsurance obligation—
and on which the primary ceding insurer relied to receive a reinsurance reserve 
credit—may well be unavailable when it is needed because the exposure of the 
affiliate or parent that is supplying the guarantee would itself be substantially 
impacted by an event triggering a reinsurance obligation. 
The ceding insurer that engages in a shadow-insurance transaction can be 
exposed to substantial risk even when a third-party bank provides a letter of credit 
to collateralize the reinsurance transactions. This is because such letters of credit are 
often guaranteed by the ceding insurer’s parent or affiliate.100 As a result, the ceding 
insurer’s parent or affiliate will ultimately bear the loss associated with the inability 
of a captive insurance company to pay funds owed under a reinsurance treaty. This, 
in turn, can undermine the financial health of the original, ceding insurer by 
weakening the financial backing of its parent and affiliate. 
Parental guarantees of letters of credit issued to collateralize a shadow-
insurance transaction increase connectivity of risk among affiliated firms in an 
additional way. In particular, regulated entities that engage in shadow-insurance 
transactions face the risk that they will have to quickly unwind a shadow-insurance 
 
97. LAWSKY, supra note 91, at 13. 
98. Ralph S.J. Koijen & Motohiro Yogo, Shadow Insurance 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 19568, Oct. 2013, revised Apr. 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w19568.pdf. 
99.  LAWSKY, supra note 91, at 1; MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, THE CAPTIVE TRIANGLE: 
WHERE LIFE INSURERS’ RESERVE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS DISAPPEAR (2013); Koijen & Yogo, 
supra note 98, at 2. 
100. See LAWSKY, supra note 91, at 7–8. 
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transaction because the third party supplying a letter of credit to collateralize the 
reinsurance obligation becomes uncomfortable with the financial position the 
ceding insurer’s parent or affiliate that is guaranteeing the letter of credit. This, of 
course, is likely to be correlated with potential financial distress at the regulated 
entity itself. If shadow-insurance transactions had to be quickly unwound due to the 
nonrenewal of a letter of credit, then the reinsured liabilities would reappear on the 
ceding insurer’s balance sheet at the precise time when it would be experiencing 
financial distress. This is significant because these liabilities are moved off of the 
ceding insurer’s balance sheet in a reinsurance transaction precisely because insurers 
do not want to maintain sufficient assets to support the reserves that are required 
under ordinary state insurance law. In other words, insurers that engage in shadow 
insurance are at substantial risk of having to quickly unwind shadow-insurance 
transactions, resulting in substantial capital deterioration, at the precise time that 
they would be facing unrelated financial distress. 
All of these concerns about shadow insurance speak only to the risks of this 
practice to individual regulated entities. But an even more significant concern is that 
shadow insurance may generate systemic risk because it allows for insurers’ long-
term liabilities to be supported by questionable and deeply opaque assets. The core 
goal of insurers that engage in shadow insurance is to hold less and lower qualities 
assets to support their long-term obligations. If these long-term obligations end up 
requiring substantially higher payouts than anticipated under prevailing models, life 
insurers could face systematic shortfalls in their ability to pay out under these 
policies. This could generate risk that might mutate to the banking sector (which 
issues many of the letters of credit that support shadow insurance), or it could result 
in panics within insurance markets themselves, as policyholders rush to withdraw 
funds from insurance products and decline to purchase new policies.101 
Despite these risks, state regulators had largely downplayed the risks associated 
with shadow insurance until approximately 2013, when the New York Insurance 
Department published a report that was deeply critical of the practice. Since then, 
state insurance regulators have implemented some reforms aimed at shadow 
insurance. But whether these reforms are sufficient is itself a subject of substantial 
debate.102 
CONCLUSION 
It has long been understood that state insurance regulation inherently faces 
various coordination problems when it comes to the regulation of large and 
complex insurance companies. These coordination problems can create increased 
 
101. See generally Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 2. 
102. Letter from Benjamin Lawsky, Superintendent, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., to Sherrod 
Brown, U.S. Senator (Apr. 27, 2015), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2015/04282015-
ltr.pdf [http://perma.cc/8EQM-PDPT] (“While the results of that process place some minor guardrails 
on new captive transactions, it will not eliminate captives and actually perpetuates the use of 
questionable assets to support reserves.”). 
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compliance costs for companies and potentially substantial gaps in regulatory 
efficacy. In response, states have coordinated extensively though the NAIC to 
mitigate compliance costs and improve regulatory efficacy. In some cases—such as 
the NAIC’s accreditation program—these efforts have been very successful. In 
other cases, such as states’ various efforts to coordinate licensing of insurance 
agents, these coordination efforts have worked poorly. 
This Article argues that state insurance regulators’ “windows and walls” 
approach to the regulation of insurance groups largely falls in the latter category. 
The core problem is that this approach relies principally on effective supervision of 
complex financial entities by regulators whose political accountability and personal 
incentives are substantially tied to state geography. But group regulation is necessary 
because of risks that extend well beyond state borders. The predictable result—as 
illustrated by both AIG’s securities-lending operations and the marked increase in 
shadow-insurance transactions—is that state insurance regulation cannot be relied 
upon to consistently monitor or respond to risks to insurance holding companies. 
This does not mean that federal regulation in this domain is necessary or even 
optimal. State regulation of insurance groups could prove reasonably effective if it 
were more enforcement insensitive. For instance, consolidated capital requirements 
for insurance groups could probably be implemented and enforced by state 
regulators relatively effectively. Similarly, rule-based restrictions on transactions 
among affiliates of insurers, such as those contained in Sections 23A and B, would 
likely limit group-related risk more effectively than the current walls of the state 
insurance regulatory system. 
If, however, enforcement-sensitive regulation of group risks remains, then it 
would likely be wise to lodge this regulation at a federal level, likely with the Fed. 
The Fed already regulates at a group level certain insurers that are deemed 
systemically significant or that own a depository institution. But to the extent that 
group risk in insurance is relevant outside of these few firms—either because group 
risk is an important factor in ordinary insurance solvency regulation, or because the 
present system of identifying a small handful of systemically risky insurers fails to 
capture the full potential scope of systemic risk in insurance—then the Fed’s role 
in regulating insurance groups should indeed be expanded in the absence of less 
enforcement-sensitive state regulation of insurance groups. 
 
